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THE PROGRESS OF THE LAW
REVISION OF NEW YORK PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
FOR many years the New York
Bench and Bar have been concerned
with the growing bulk of the various
procedural statutes and rules "under
which they stagger." In an effort to
simplify and streamline the practices
and procedures of state courts, the
Temporary Commission on the
Courts has formed an advisory group
to work closely with its Subcommittee on Modernization and Simplification of Practice and Procedure. This
group is composed of Dean John F.
X. Finn of the Fordham University
Law School, Professor Samuel M.

Hesson, Albany Law School, Professor John W. MacDonald, Cornell
Law School, former U. S. District
Judge Harold M. Kennedy, Jackson
A. Dykman, former President of the
New York State Bar Association and
James 0. Moore, Jr., State Solicitor
General. Professor Jack B. Weinstein of the Columbia University
School of Law will act as Consultant
and Reporter to this advisory group
and it is expected that assistance of
additional experts will be solicited as
the work proceeds.

STATE COURTS AMONG SLOWEST IN COUNTRY
Institute of Judicial Administration has just released its third annual survey which covers the activities of 98 courts in 48 states during
the first six months of 1955. The Institute's findings indicate that delays
in bringing non-jury cases to trial
have decreased 10% from last year
to an average delay of 4.6 months.
However, the average delay for jury
cases is 11.4 months, a slight increase
over an average delay of 11.1 months
in 1954.
The Supreme Courts of Queens,
New York, Kings and Bronx CounTHE

ties were listed among the twelve
principal state courts in the country
where the average delay in jury cases
is 25 months or more. In Queens
County for example, the delay averaged 44 months which was second
only to the Superior Court of Worcester County, Massachusetts, where 46
months was the rule. New York
County exhibited an average delay
of 39 months, Kings County and
Bronx County 38 months.
This lag has formed the basis for a
study by the State Temporary Commission on the Courts.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE COURTS
Somm months ago, the New York
State Temporary Commission on the
Courts announced a proposed plan
which would consolidate the present

state courts into five new courts.
These new courts would be as follows:
The Supreme Court of Appeals,
which would be the court of last re-
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sort for the state; the Appellate
Court, which would hear appeals
taken from all trial courts; the Superior Court, which would have unlimited jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal cases; the District Court,
which would have limited civil jurisdiction over cases of a limited dollar
amount and criminal jurisdiction
over offenses below the grade of misdemeanors.
This new system would absorb the
Appellate Divisions, the Appellate
Terms, the Supreme Court, The
Court of Claims, the Surrogate's
Courts, The County Courts, the
Court of General Sessions of the
County of New York, the Children's
Courts, The Court of Domestic Relations of New York City, The City
Court of New York City, The Court
of Special Sessions of New York City,
the Municipal Court of New York
City, the City Magistrate's Courts of
New York City, The District Court
of Nassau County, the Justice of the
Peace Courts in 929 towns, the Police
Justices Courts in 549 incorporated
villages, and the Local Lower Courts
of which there are 87 in 61 cities outside of New York City.
The proposed plan provides that

all judges, except local magistrates
outside of New York City, would be
continued in office until their current
terms expired and that all nonjudicial personnel would be absorbed
into the new system. During the
transition period vacancies in court
positions caused by deaths, retirements and resignations would not be
filled except to keep courts up to a
strength to be determined by the
Legislature. Naturally, such a sweeping change as the Commission's plan
would require a proposed amendment
to the state constitution followed by
passage by two successive legislatures
and approval by the state's voters.
The Temporary State Commission
on the Courts has scheduled ten public hearings to be held in nine cities
during the month of October, 1955.
These hearings will be held in Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Binghamton, Albany, Glens Falls, White
Plains, Mineola, Brooklyn and Manhattan. After these public hearings,
a final plan will be prepared by the
Commission for recommendation to
the Governor and the Legislature. At
this date, great opposition to the proposal has been voiced at the Buffalo
hearing.

FAMILY COURT
ON September 13, 1955, a Special
Term, Part XII of the Supreme Court
of New York County, was established
to handle matrimony and child custody cases. This court, together with
psychiatric and social work services,
will be utilized to handle such cases
in an effort to provide a more sympa-

thetic and effective forum for the
resolution of family problems.
A recommendation for the establishment of a state-wide "family
court" which would be similar to although more inclusive than Special
Term, Part XII, was introduced recently to the Conference on Juvenile
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Delinquency held in Albany, New
York, early in October.
The proposed plan would create a
Court with as broad jurisdiction as
the Supreme Court. All civil and
social problems affecting the welfare
of children and families would be
brought before this Court which
would have services similar to its
New York County prototype.
At the same conference, a recommendation was made to raise the age

[VOL,. I

limit under the Youthful Offender
Act to twenty-one. Under the present
age limit, offenders sixteen to eighteen may be tried in the youth parts
of the General Sessions or County
Courts where penalties are left to the
discretion of the presiding judge.
Raising the age limit is designed to
offer maximum salvage with reference to the rehabilitation of a greater
number of Juvenile Delinquents than
heretofore.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
IN the June issue of the LAW

FoRum, it was noted that a $175,001.
libel judgment against columnist
Westbrook Pegler and two Hearst
newspapers had been affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit. An application
for a Writ of Certiorari by the defendants was denied by the Supreme
Court on October 10, 1955 on the
ground that there was no federal
question involved.

ADDED INSURANCE BENEFITS
IT was announced on October 4,
1955 by Leffert Holz, New York
State Superintendent of Insurance,
that liability carriers will indemnify
the owners of insured cars for personal injuries caused by the negligence of uninsured drivers. This step
will in all probability quiet the clamor
for compulsory coverage. Under the
new coverage, the owner of the insured car, his spouse and any relative
of either, if they live in his household,
will be indemnified for injuries suffered by them while they are riding
in the insured vehicle or if they are
injured while pedestrians. Moreover,
the new coverage will apply to any
other person injured while riding in
the insured car provided it was being

driven by the owner or with his consent.
In the case of stock and independent companies, a claimant for benefits
will be required to prove that the.
driver of the uninsured car was negligent. The mutual companies on the
other hand, will presume that the latter was negligent, leaving the amount
of damages the only issue to be decided.
The maximum liability under the
new coverage will be $10,000 to any
one person injured in a accident, and
$20,000 to all persons injured in a
single accident, which are incidentally the present minimum limits for
automobile coverage in New York.
Indemnification may be had for
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accidents that occur in any state or
territory in the United States as well
as in Canada.
Under the stock company plan, the
claimant may apply for arbitration
if there is a dispute as to the legal
liability of the uninsured driver and
the arbitrator would determine the
amount of damages to be paid.
The mutual company plan provides
for the appointment of appraisers to
determine the amount of liability in
case of a dispute. By the use of arbitrators and appraisers, the companies
hope to avoid clogging the already
congested courts with new litigation.
However, the new plan raises many
interesting questions which will have

to be answered before long. For example, assuming that an accident
with an uninsured driver results in a
suit against the carrier's assured, the
latter will be defended by the insurance company which will take the
position that he was non-negligent.
At the same time, it may resist his
claim on the ground that he was contributorily negligent. The resultant
conflict of interest may prove a decisive roadblock to the success of the
plan. Furthermore, what will be the
carrier's position where its insured
has been injured by a hit-and-run
driver? Will it assume that the driver
was uninsured or will actual proof of
lack of coverage be required?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S HONOR RECRUITMENT PROGRAM
THE Attorney General has just released a report regarding the success
of its new Honor Recruitment Program for 1954. Under this program,
thirty top graduates of American law
schools were selected by the Department of Justice and assigned whenever possible to divisions of their
choice.
The purpose of the program is not
to attract attorneys to Government
careers but to obtain qualified lawyers
who will remain with the Department
for three to five years. Initial salaries

are commensurate with those paid by
private firms although they cannot
match those paid after several years
in private practice.
The Justice Department hopes to
extend this program to all agencies of
the Government which utilize the
services of attorneys. In 1955, it has
announced that it will take in forty
honor graduates who will be given
high level responsibility as soon as
possible after assignment to an appropriate division.

JURY-ROOM MICROPHONES
Som months ago it was disclosed
that the University of Chicago Law
School under a grant from the Ford
Foundation had planted secret microphones in the jury rooms during five

civil cases in Wichita, Kansas. This
practice was apparently approved by
the presiding federal judge in Wichita
as well as by the senior judge of the
Tenth Circruit, Orrie L. Phillips, pro-
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vided the consent of the parties was
secured.
After this practice was publicly
disclosed, the Senate Subcommittee
on Internal Security scheduled hearings. Dean Edward H. Levi defended the use of secret microphones as a
legitimate part of a research project
investigating the jury system in the
United States. Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., the instructor in charge of
the jury-tapping project, stated that,
although the law school had no immediate plans for further use of
microphones, he would not foreclose
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such a practice in the future if it
were deemed necessary for research
purposes.
Senators Eastland and Jenner
maintained that this action by the
law school violated the principle of
secret deliberation by a jury and the
latter indicated that Congress would
have to take legislative action to prevent "this eavesdropping on juries."
The subcommittee's report condemned the practice, a stand that was
taken by the Attorney General and
editorial writers of leading newspapers.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
THE American Bar Association has
eliminated from the certification that
prospective members must sign, any
reference to the list of subversive
organizations maintained by the Attorney General. Formerly, this certification required applicants to state
that, to the best of their knowledge,
they did not belong to any of the 300
or more organizations on Mr. Brownell's list.
The new certification reads as
follows: "I hereby certify that no
disciplinary proceedings are pending
against me, that I have never been
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, that I am not now or have
I ever been a member of the Communist Party or of any organization

which to my knowledge is a subversive organization and that, if elected,
I will abide by the association's constitution, its by-laws and its canons
of ethics."
Last August, at the Association's
convention in Philadelphia, Lloyd
Wright, its retiring president, called
for a "bloodless revolution" to restore
what he referred to as "ancient
This action by the
liberties."
American Bar Association represents
its first response to Mr. Wright's
warning that the Attorney General's
list should be taken with a grain of
salt in ascertaining an individual's
eligibility to membership in the
American Bar Association.

STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
closing of a court room to the public
RECENTLY the New York Court of
Appeals decided that a newspaper and the press at the request of the
had no standing to challenge the defendant. (See United Press As-
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sociation v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71,
123 N.E. 2d 777). Subsequent to
this decision, the New York Post
sought an order requiring an official
stenographer in the Kings County
Court to transcribe and deliver to it
a copy of a charge made by the judge
of that court in a criminal trial held
before him and a jury which terminated in the acquittal of the defendant.
The newspaper proceeded by way
of mandamus after both the stenographer and the judge had refused to
make the transcript available at the
former's expense. The newspaper
based its position on the ground that
it had suffered injury in carrying on
its business as a reporter of "public
events of public importance." Mr.
Justice Di Giovanna held that the
stenographic minutes of criminal
trials which had not been filed with

the Clerk of the Court pursuant to a
statute or judicial order, were not
records or papers in a public office
under Section 66 of the Public Officers Law and that the New York
Post had no standing to compel a
court stenographer to finish it with
a transcript of the charge.
The newspaper in its moving
papers claimed that the stenographer's refusal was based on a prohibition imposed by the county judge.
Mr. Justice Di Giovanna, although
stressing that this allegation had not
been proved, indicated that it was immaterial in view of the fact that this
ban would not protect the stenographer from his failure to perform a
legal duty if one existed. However,
in view of the fact that no such duty
rested upon the court stenographer,
the newspaper's petition was dismissed.

FIFTH AMENDMENT
IN the March issue of the LAw
FoRum, the case of Sheiner v.
Florida, which involved the fitness of
an attorney to practice law after invoking the Fifth Amendment, was
noted. The use of this constitutional
privilege by a pre-trial witness in a
civil suit was recently discussed by
Mr. Justice Walter in the Supreme
Court, New York County. In Southbridge Finishing Co. vs. Golding, the
plaintiff moved to compel the defendant to answer certain questions proposed to him during an examination
before trial or to strike his answer
because of his failure to do so.
During the examination before

trial the defendant, who had interposed a verified answer to a complaint
which charged him with entering into
a criminal conspiracy to cheat and
defraud the plaintiff, refused to
answer almost every question put to
him upon the ground of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Mr. Justice Walter, in denying plaintiff's motion, held that the
interposition of a verified answer
which denied the material allegations
of the plaintiff's complaint was not a
waiver of the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination, despite the
fact that the answer also contained
affirmative defenses. He indicated
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that the privilege would be waived
only when the party asserting it has
actually given incriminating evidence
against himself and that the defendant's answer was not tantamount to
such testimony.
Furthermore, since the plaintiff in
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the action was actively engaged in an
effort to prove by the defendant's
own testimony that he was guilty of
the crime alleged in the complaint, it
could not be said that the privilege
was not invoked in good faith.

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
AT last summer's annual meeting of the American Bar Association at Philadelphia, Edwin M.
Otterbourg, a past chairman of its
Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, delivered an address on this subject which should
be of considerable interest to the
profession.
Mr. Otterbourg employed as his
definition of the term "unauthorized
practice of the law," that coined by
the Supreme Court of Iowa which
called it "the attempt by laymen
and corporations to make it a business for profit of giving the public
as a substitute, the services of unqualified and unprofessional persons,
or to employ and furnish for profit,
directly or indirectly, the services of
lawyers who may be willing to sabotage professional ethics in order to
secure employment."
Until the American Revolution,
lawyers, because of their insistence
on extremely high ethical standards,
were held in great esteem by the
public at large. However, during the
nineteenth century which witnessed
the tremendous growth of the coun-

try, standards fell rapidly until the
bar itself adopted its Canons of
Ethics after 1908.
It was an essential corollary of
these Canons that the layman had to
be protected from non-lawyers who,
unhampered by ethical considerations, were performing legal services. Accordingly, both the bar associations and the courts as well as
business groups cooperated to define
and delineate the orbit of "legal
services."
Mr. Otterbourg traced the development of this joint effort through
cases involving accountants, corporations, realtors, collection agencies,
life insurance companies, law publishers and others. The end result
has been that "the fences consisting of codes of ethics, modern statutes, and decided case law, have
been pretty strongly built and are
fairly high." However, he urged the
profession to be continuously vigilant and to protect the layman by
recognizing that the enforcement of
professional ethics and the prevention of the unauthorized practice of
law go hand in hand.
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE
ON August 1, 1955, the Atomic
Energy Commission issued proposed
rules of practice relating to its licensing program. These rules, when
adopted, will govern the conduct of
proceedings before the Commission
with reference to the licensing of
by-product, source and special nuclear material, production and utilization facilities, patents, and op-

erators. These proposed rules may
be found in the Federal Register for
August 10, 1955. Further information with reference to these rules
may be obtained by writing to the
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Director, Division of Civilian Application.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
AN interesting opinion regarding
the disqualification of attorneys was
recently rendered by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (See Lasky Brothers of
West Virginia v. Warner Brothers
Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824.) The
majority opinion was written by
Chief Judge Clark and affirmed an
order of the District Court disqualifying a former member of a law firm
which had been previously disqualified from handling an anti-trust suit
for the plaintiff because one partner
had represented the defendant in
similar litigation.
After the firm had been disqualified, it was dissolved and the former
partner who had not been involved
prior to the formation of the partnership became the attorney for the

plaintiff. Judge Clark held that this
attorney was likewise disqualified
because he had been in a position to
receive confidential communications
with reference to the defendant from
his former associate. The subsequent
dissolution of the partnership could
not cure his ineligibility to act as
counsel.
However, Judge Clark refused to
disqualify this attorney in a companion suit where he was retained
after the dissolution of the partnership by a plaintiff which came to
him completely independent of his
erstwhile associate and where he rebutted the inference that he had received confidential information from
the first attorney. There is a vigorous dissent to this position by Judge
Ryan.

